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Introduction 
 «Просто денег нет сейчас. Найдем деньги — сделаем индексацию. Вы держитесь здесь, вам 
всего доброго, хорошего настроения и здоровья».2 
 
During his visit to Crimea in late May 2016, Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, responding to a 
question about the indexation of pensions from a local pensioner, used the phrase cited in the 
epigraph above. Slightly modified from its original, the phrase "Денег нет, но вы держитесь" 
became an instant classic, inviting creative responses among the users of Russian social media.3 
“There is no money, but you hang in (there)” encapsulates a host of issues related to the financing 
of Russian government obligations in the social sphere in conditions of a severe revenue shortfall. 
Following years of economic growth since the early 2000s, which brought budget expansions and 
rises in personal income interrupted only by the impact of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), in the 
last two years Russian policy-makers have started making adjustments to the new economic reality. 
The crisis into which the Russian economy plummeted in the second half of 2014 arose chiefly 
from the twin shock of the drop in oil prices and the introduction of international sanctions in 
response to the Ukraine crisis but was precipitated by the weakening of the Russian economy 
during the period of stagnant growth in 2012-2013 (World Bank 2016).  
 
The crisis hit Russian government finances as well as Russian households hard. According to 
Aleksei Kudrin, former finance minister who recently resumed an important policy-making role,4 
                                                          
1 The author is grateful to Stephen Fortescue, Markku Kivinen, Vesa Korhonen, Ben Noble and the anonymous 
reviewer for this journal for their help and helpful comments to the earlier drafts of this article. 
2 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WSq7oxM_fyo.  
3 http://fishki.net/1961862-deneg-net-no-vy-zdes-derzhites-kak-socseti-otreagirovali-na-slova-
medvedeva.html 
4 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HYB7oDOesg0 
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the fall in the oil price has led to a 4 percent reduction in GDP.5 This is equivalent to the entire 
education budget and more than its health-care budget. In addition, average real incomes over the 
period 2014-16 have declined. In 2015 average household incomes dropped by 4.1 percent, and 5.6 
percent in 2016. Average monthly real wages were 100.7 percent of their level a year earlier, 
whereas real pensions were 96.6 percent compared to 2015.6 Official poverty levels increased from 
11.2 percent in 2012 to 15.7 percent in the first half of 2016 (Burdyak and Grishina 2016). In 
conditions of declining incomes and consumption, most Russians are reliant on state social support, 
in the form of pensions, welfare benefits, and salaries of public sector employees (Maleva 2016: 
16). In an environment of decreased budget revenues, declines in real incomes and high 
expectations associated with state social provision make budget cuts in the social sphere a highly 
contentious issue.  
 
Social policy is important for the Russian state both in ideological and monetary terms. It has 
occupied an important place in strategic documents – notably Concept 2020 and Strategy 2020 - 
and the May Decrees of Vladimir Putin. In these documents social policy is seen as an integral 
component of Russia’s pursuit of a greater role on the global stage, economic development and 
security (Cooper 2012; Connolly 2013). This emphasis is due to a number of factors: the realization 
by policy-makers of Russia’s extremely poor demographic outlook, the perception of the failings of 
the liberal social reforms introduced in the early 2000s, the growing developmental aspirations of 
the ruling elite, and electoral motives. All these factors have reinforced each other over the last 
decade to give special significance to social measures, leading the government to develop new 
policies and institutional structures in the social sphere. Even though over the last decade the 
growth of social spending was not out of proportion with the growth of the consolidated budget 
expenditure as a whole (Sutela 2012: 196-202 and Table 1 below), nonetheless it constitutes the 
state’s largest expense item. Over 60 percent of consolidated budget outlays are directed to four 
broad sub-fields: (1) housing and housing services, (2) education, culture and mass media, (3) 
health and sport, (4) social security including pensions. In conditions of Russia’s heightened 
international role social spending has to be balanced with other significant budgetary items, 
particularly defense spending, the share of which in the 2016 federal budget is 24 percent 
                                                          
5 The latest official Rosstat figures show that in 2015-2016 the GDP dropped by 3.1 percent. 
http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/ru/statistics/accounts/#  
6 Rosstat http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/ru/statistics/population/level/# and 
BOFIT 
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(Visloguzov 2016a).7 Drawing on examples from different areas of social policy, this paper 
concentrates on the two most contentious issues involving the social sphere in the crisis budget 
process: the indexation of the salaries of state sector employees (biudzhetniki) and social payments, 
specifically old-age pensions and Maternity Capital, the latter by far the largest social benefit with 
implications for Russian demographic and housing policies. 
 
The article builds on the academic literature covering Vladimir Putin’s leadership, combined with a 
thorough reading of official government and media sources for the period since late 2014. The 
broad foundation for the article’s argument derives from the comparative political science and 
social policy literatures, their institutionalist strand specifically - what can be summarized as 
“politics matters” in defining welfare arrangements (Cook 2007). This scholarship argues that the 
impact of structural factors, such as the effects of drastic reductions in state budget revenues on 
welfare policy decisions, is mediated by the influence of political factors. Thus, the article focuses 
on the interrelated influence of policy actors’ interests and expert ideas in the negotiation of 
reductions in social spending, in conditions of Russia’s non-democratic political regime. 
 
Within the Russian studies literature the analysis follows “institutionalist” as opposed to 
“personality-based” explanations of the policy process in Russia (Fortescue 2015, 2017 [in this 
special issue], Remington 2015). This literature argues that the institutional structure of the dual 
executive, operating within an authoritarian political regime, leads to a slow and drawn-out process 
of consensus-building, the participants in which are bureaucratic agencies and non-state actors 
associated with them. There is a de facto partisan divide between left and right blocs of bureaucratic 
agencies which essentially act as representatives for societal constituencies. The president, who in 
this tradition is credited with setting the general direction of policy, reluctantly has to support one 
side to put an end to prolonged policy elaboration in which institutional policy-makers fear taking 
responsibility. The budget process occupies an important place in this policy dynamic, as the annual 
budget cycle provides impetus for actors to reach decisions (Remington 2014). 
 
In terms of the aims and capacity of Russian social policy, this article speaks to arguments made by 
scholars of the Russian welfare state that in conditions of non-democratic politics, social policy 
                                                          
7 Also see Cooper (2017), in this volume. 
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priorities are defined by the interests of political and bureaucratic elites, rather than the popular 
representation of interests (Kivinen 2016; Sutela 2012; Cook 2007). Within this line of argument, 
however, it has been suggested that Russian social policy spending priorities have oscillated 
between fiscal conservatism expounded by the economic and financial bloc of government, and 
active social policy associated with the social bloc and “involving greater amount of funds being 
made available and targeted for social issues” (Kivinen 2016). This article presents evidence that 
qualifies this argument. It shows that actors usually viewed as adherents of monetary restraint, such 
as Aleksei Kudrin, have advocated greater state investment in such areas as education, healthcare, 
and higher living standards. Kudrin sees these as “productive” areas of social policy, investments in 
which contribute to the country’s “human capital” and are indispensible for the creation of a 
knowledge-based economy.8 This is in contrast to “non-productive” spending, including 
unreformed pension provision, poorly targeted social benefits, and defence.9    
 
The article first examines Russian social policy in terms of the interests and ideas of influential 
policy-makers. It identifies important administrative and policy structures in the social sphere. 
Specifically it refers to National Priority Projects, the May Decrees, and Priority Projects introduced 
during the summer of 2016. I then consider the process involved in defining indexation rates for 
biudzhetnik salaries, pensions, Maternity Capital and the freesing of contributions to the cumulative 
pension funds.  
 
Table 1. Consolidated government budget* expenditures - social policy share of total 
expenditure, % 
      
 
Social Housing Education, Health and Social 
 
policy, and culture sports security, 
 
total** communal and mass 
 
including 
  
services media 
 
pensions 
      2005 60,3 6,9 14,0 11,7 27,7 
2006 61,8 7,5 14,6 11,5 28,2 
2007 60,9 9,7 14,0 12,1 25,1 
2008 59,6 8,1 13,9 10,9 26,6 
                                                          
8 Such views are close to the findings of recent research on the “developmental state” which has emphasized the 
importance of a social policy component for successful industrial development (Evans 2014). 
9 Kudrin, speaking at the Sochi Forum, 30 September 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HYB7oDOesg0.   
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2009 59,1 6,3 13,1 10,3 29,4 
2010 63,6 6,1 12,8 9,7 35,1 
2011 62,2 6,0 13,2 10,5 32,6 
2012 61,7 4,6 13,0 10,7 33,4 
2013 62,2 4,2 13,4 10,0 34,6 
2014 58,5 3,6 12,9 10,1 31,9 
2015 61,0 3,3 12,0 10,5 35,2 
2016*** 60-60,5 3,2 11,7 10,9 about 34,5 
      *     federal budget, regional and local budgets, and state social funds 
**   sum of the four columns that follow 
  *** preliminary data 
    
 
Source: Russian Ministry of Finance and BOFIT 
 
 
The sources of budget policy-making in the Russian social sphere 
The position of key policy makers on social policy and its funding is a function of their internalized 
systems of values, expert advice and interest in popularity and electoral votes. The most powerful 
actor in the Russian policy process is Vladimir Putin, and his set of views generally determines the 
direction of budget policy, including in the social sphere. The fundamental beliefs of the President 
regarding the economy, specifically fiscal prudency and macro-economic stability, are important for 
an understanding of the president’s policy preferences. Another key component of his outlook 
relates to the use of Russia’s oil and gas wealth to spur economic development and the 
improvement of citizens’ welfare. Those relying on the state budget for their income, such as 
teachers, doctors, scientists and pensioners, support the president.10 To these we may add such 
procedural features of Putin’s style of governance as a belief in strategic documents - “the urge to 
plan” (Cooper 2012: 1) - and reliance on policy experts working in state ministries and affiliated 
non-state structures. Connected to this is what we could call “the urge to integrate”, bringing 
together different levels of authority and policy areas when they bear on a specific problem, a 
process also mentioned by Cooper (ibid: 3).11  
                                                          
10 As well as those working at unprofitable enterprises in Russia’s heartland, as long as they have employment 
and stability (Crowly 2015). 
11 While popular in contemporary public policy thinking and practice, policy integration is a challenging task 
even in conditions of democracy and a well-functioning civil service. In Russia this approach to policy-making is 
further complicated by the weakness of formal institutions, lack of accountability, and corruption (Monaghan 
2013, Huskey 2009). 
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The attention to the social sphere during Putin’s tenure has its roots in advice provided Russia by 
international institutions in the early 1990s, which was further elaborated in the “Gref programme” 
at the start of Putin’s presidency (ibid, Cook 2007, Sutela 2012). The group of experts originally 
involved in producing the program were based in the purpose-built Center for Strategic 
Development (CSR), and included German Gref, El’vira Nabiullina, Yaroslav Kuzminov and 
Arkadiy Dvorkovich. They have remained in prominent state and affiliated positions throughout 
Putin’s leadership. They, together with Aleksei Kudrin, a close colleague of Putin since their days 
in St Petersburg, have continued to be key defenders of tight monetary policy. This group of top 
policy-makers remains among the very few “to whom the president [actually] listens” (Orekhin 
2016a). In 2016 Kudrin re-joined mainstream politics when elected deputy chair of the Presidential 
Economic Council and put in charge of writing a new strategy for Russia’s development post-2018, 
which might become Putin’s next pre-election program (Khamraev 2016). As of autumn 2016 
Kudrin has taken an active role in the budget process (Kriuchkova and Butrin 2016a).  
 
Policies developed by this group of reformers, including for the social sphere, were adopted in 
2004. Yet, unexpectedly for them some of the measures, particularly the monetization of in-kind 
benefits, provoked mass protests by pensioners during winter 2004-05. Mass demonstrations 
prompted changes in social policy preferences towards a slower pace of reform and greater state 
intervention (Wengle and Russel 2008, Remington 2011). In addition, the increase in budget 
revenues due to rising oil prices allowed extra funds to be dedicated to social issues, producing an 
“oil-led” social policy (Cerami 2009). Yet, decisions on how the extra resources should be spent 
was determined by policy interests and ideas shared by influential actors at that time. The set-backs 
resulting from the popular protests threatened the top leadership’s hold on power. This made them 
receptive to ideas expressed by many Russian social scientists outside the narrow circle mentioned 
above.  
 
The alternative specialists argued that earlier policies failed to address important challenges facing 
the country: an unprecedented deterioration of living standards, a rapidly worsening demographic 
outlook, and the unaffordability for the majority of many social goods provided by market 
structures, including housing (Zavisca 2012, Khmelnitskaya 2015). A strong emphasis on social 
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problems and a statist approach to solving them appeared in the presidential address to the national 
assembly in April 2005 (Putin 2005), in which the president called for several National Priority 
projects to improve health outcomes and birthrates, as well as educational standards and housing 
affordability. Cooper (2012: 3) traces to this period the interest in developing strategic plans linking 
Russia’s international standing and economic development with demography and social policy.  
 
Introduced in 2006, four National Priority Projects were supervised by Dmitry Medvedev and were 
developed in cooperation with the think tank associated with him, the Institute for Contemporary 
Development (INSOR) (www.insor-russia.ru/ru/priorities/national_priorities). The projects 
contributed to Medvedev’s popular appeal among voters, including during his presidential term 
2008-12. During his presidency the national projects, formulated as state programs,12 became a 
regular part of the Russian budget (Kivinen 2016).13  
 
The electoral cycle of 2007-08 saw another policy innovation relating to the social sphere, as well 
as to the wider economy, specifically the creation of what came to be known as “institutions of 
development”, state-sponsored organisations aimed at leveraging budget funding with private funds 
for specific policy tasks. In the housing sphere, for instance, two state Funds (fondy) were set up in 
2007 and 2008 (Khmelnitskaya 2015). In creating these structures policy-makers responded to the 
view in specialist circles that state intervention is unavoidable as “poor” apartment owners were 
unable to afford critically needed major repairs to their apartment buildings. Yet, the populist 
motives of the ruling elite during the pre-election period should not be overlooked. The poor state 
of housing and persistent increases in housing charges have consistently been among the most 
concerning issues for the public (Levada-Tsentr 2015: 9).  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
12 For instance the state programme for housing, in its latest version from April 2014, available at 
http://www.minstroyrf.ru/trades/realizaciya-gosudarstvennyh-programm/29/. 
13 Spending on national priority projects and federal targeted programs can be accessed at 
http://datamarts.roskazna.ru/razdely/rashody/. 
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Key policy-makers, their interests and ideas in the areas of social spending 
The ideological position of Dmitry Medvedev during his presidency and after has been 
characterized as a discourse of modernization, innovation, and participatory forms of government. 
With input from his INSOR advisors and other experts, it is a position which had a significant 
regime-legitimising effect in the post-GFC environment (Feklyunina and White 2011). Social 
policy-making included a rapid increase in benefits and pensions in 2009-10, evident from Table 1. 
This could be seen as an anti-crisis measure as recommended by international financial institutions 
(Kivinen 2016). At the same time, it was reinforced by the paternalistic social ideas of then Prime 
Minister, Vladimir Putin. We may also perceive an echo of the advocacy of increased budget 
spending on “human capital” in the context of the need to create a knowledge-based economy, 
something popular among the expert community and to be found in strategic documents written in 
2008 and 2012. The increase in spending described as the “+4 -2 manoeuver” envisaged greater 
funding for – according to Kudrin’s terminology – the “productive” part of social policy: health and 
education as well as R&D (Cooper 2012: 10, Connolly 2013: 7-8), at the expense of unreformed 
pensions and benefits and military and law enforcement spending. The importance of structural 
reforms, particularly in the area of pensions, was highlighted. Nonetheless, greater commitments to 
social spending in the aftermath of the GFC have generated policy challenges in the post-2014 
period of budget consolidation.  
 
Despite Medvedev’s fascination with innovation-led growth, his personal role in promoting “active 
social policy” was modest. He lashed with Aleksei Kudrin, then finance minister in Putin’s 
government, over the growth of military spending. Kudrin resigned in September 2011. 
Medvedev’s influence has been primarily in the sphere of administration and maintaining a 
balanced policy discourse, with key priorities set within the other part of Russia’s dual-executive. 
For instance, when presenting his report on the government’s work to parliament in April 2014 – a 
month after the takeover of Crimea – Medvedev stressed that Russia has a right to follow its own 
path to development, but noted immediately after that the country nonetheless could not ignore the 
universal laws of economics (Khamraev and Oktiabrev 2014).  
 
The emphasis on social policy as a means to invest in the country’s human capital that appeared in 
the late 2000s and has remained strong to the present (Kuzminov et al 2015), provided the 
9 
 
ideational basis for a series of articles published by Putin in 2011-early 2012 and the May decrees 
of 2012 that set the tone for his third presidential term. Five of eleven decrees were devoted to 
social issues: social support, healthcare, education and science, housing, and demographics.14 Apart 
from the provision of higher quality services and reaching certain targets for health and educational 
outcomes, the decrees contained a pledge to raise salaries of biudzhetniki - doctors, teachers and 
scientists - to levels above the regional average and comparable to those in the commercial sector. 
 
Putin’s discoursive commitment to the implementation of the May decrees15 has been maintained in 
recent years but came under pressure during the budget process in 2016. Progress in their 
implementation has been monitored by state-sponsored public organisations such as the All-Russian 
National Front (Kommersant 2015) and by the dedicated Presidential Commission on the 
Implementation of the May Decrees (Kolesnikov 2016). The sessions (zasedaniya) of the 
Commission have been highly publicized, as were government meetings (soveshchaniya) leading up 
to them (Kriuchkova and Manuilova 2016). This, paired with a series of executive dismissals and 
resignations – arguably the most visible being the resignation of Vladislav Surkov as deputy prime 
minister on the first anniversary of the May decrees - and recurring threats to introduce 
administrative and even criminal responsibility for officials failing to meet decree-related targets 
(Kozichev and Shelkovnikov 2016), demonstrates the important legitimacy-seeking element in 
policy commitments in the social sphere. It also highlights the difficulty of implementation through 
reliance on Putin’s power vertikal’ (Monaghan 2013). During the 2016 budget process the 
maintenance and further increase in biudzhetnik salaries became one of the most controversial 
topics.  
 
In mid-2016, in circumstances of tough negotiations over the new three-year budget, parliamentary 
elections approaching in September, and presidential elections scheduled for 2018, the policy-
makers’ concern for popularity led them to revive the somewhat forgotten instrument of Priority 
Projects. Eleven priority projects - not equivalent to the May decrees, but still relating to the social 
and business environment - were originally to cost the budget R160 billion. This was reduced to 
                                                          
14 The decrees (Numbers 596-606) were signed by Vladimir Putin on 7 May 2012, the day of his inauguration to 
a third presidential term. As an example, Decree N 606 on demographic policy is available at 
http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/news/15257 .  
15 The real commitment to the implementation of May Decrees has not been and could not be complete. Some of 
the targets set by decrees – such as 50 percent labour productivity increase – had an element of wishful thinking 
about them and were not borne out by the Russian economic reality. 
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R150 billion (1 percent of budget spending) in the draft budget approved by cabinet on 13 October 
2016, while another R100 billion was reserved for various purposes, including the priority projects 
(http://government.ru/meetings/24877/stenograms/, Butrin et al 2016). In nominal terms this is the 
same as that allocated to the original 2006 national priority projects (Netreba 2016a); in real terms 
the present sum of USD 2.4 billion is less than half the funding of ten years earlier (over USD 5.5 
billion).16  
 
In late June 2016 a new consultative body, the Council for Strategic Development and Priority 
Projects, chaired by the president and including important figures from the economic and financial 
bloc of the government, was set up and began immediate intensive work.17 Between July and early 
October six sessions of the Council were held, two of which were chaired by the president. The 
others, held as meetings of the Council’s presidium, were chaired by Medvedev. At the earlier 
meetings held in August, it was announced that a new set of priorities would be formulated only in 
2017 (Orekhin 2016a). Yet, by early October 2016, at a session of the Presidium of the Council held 
at the Sochi Economic Forum, eleven priority projects were discussed. This session of the Council, 
chaired by Medvedev and with the participation of regional governors, underlined the regional 
dimension in the eleven priority areas. Medvedev summarized the important electoral rationale 
behind the projects when he closeed the meeting with the following words:  
 
We need results in the shortest term. You know what I am talking about, and hope you will do all 
that is necessary. In a year and a half people should be able to feel changes [for the good] in the 
spheres covered by our projects (http://government.ru/news/24742/).  
 
First deputy prime minister Igor’ Shuvalov has been put in charge of the projects’ supervision. 
Shuvalov18 – a close colleague of Putin since the early 2000s and responsible for the financial and 
economic bloc of the government - is said to have a major influence over the president. Although 
seemingly he does not work directly with the social sphere, he supervises the Ministry for 
Construction (Minstroy) and affiliated “institutions of development” in the housing sphere. Thus, he 
                                                          
16 Author’s own calculations on the basis is figures cited in Netreba (2016a). 
17 Members included from the economic-financial bloc: Kudrin, Siluanov, Uliukaev, but also the pro-growth 
presidential advisor Andrey Belousov and the president of Delovaya Rossiaya Aleksei Repik, and the head of the 
social bloc Ol’ga Golodets, see  http://www.kremlin.ru/events/councils/by-council/1029/52297  
18 For biography see http://government.ru/gov/persons/3/bio/  
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is coordinating the government’s work on housing affordability, a key socially-oriented policy 
issue. His policy position appears close to the fiscal conservatives within the economic and 
financial bloc. For instance, he has been the driving force behind the recent initiative to “optimize” 
the institutions of development. This has meant reduced spending and increased supervision of state 
corporations and Funds. Putin spoke of the need to review these structures in his address to the 
Federal Assembly in December 2015 (Netreba 2016b). Work in that direction had already begun 
earlier in the year with Shuvalov’s April directive to reduce spending for the previously mentioned 
housing Funds.19 Evidence that Shuvalov is pushing optimization hard is the fact that the 
construction ministry was the only ministry which undertook the reform and disclosed its spending 
on Funds, while the Ministry of Economics struggled to get any action from other sectoral 
ministries.  
 
However, the fiscal conservatism which Shuvalov demonstrates co-exists with his close connection 
to pro-growth actors in and close to the government (in the broad sense): presidential advisor 
Andrei Belousov and members of the Stolypin Club and Delovaya Rossiya business association. 
Belousov was one of the original sponsors of the Agency for Strategic Initiatives (ASI) and has 
advanced the implementation of its projects (Freinkman and Yakovlev 2015: 362). Shuvalov, 
meanwhile, has worked closely with experts in the housing sphere who participated in such ASI-
supervised initiatives as raising Russia’s ranking in the World Bank’s Doing Business Guide (ibid 
361).20 
 
Like Belousov, Alexandra Levitskaya is a presidential advisor, but with a more direct involvement 
in social policy. Before her current appointment in 2013, she held senior posts within the 
government apparatus, at the Ministry of Economics in Putin’s government, where she worked with 
Elvira Nabiullina, Belousov and Andrey Klepach, and at the Ministry of Health in the mid-2000s 
when she worked closely with Medvedev on National Priority projects (Grishin et al 2013). 
Described in some sources as a close associate of Shuvalov,21 and as “one of the most influential 
female politicians in contemporary Russia, whose experience and opinion is highly valued by the 
                                                          
19 See The strategy of development of the joint institution of development in the housing sphere, from 26 
February 2016, http://www.minstroyrf.ru/odata/council-of-state/11641/ , page 5 
20 See Igor’ Shuvalov and other important actors in the housing sphere - minister of construction Mikhail Men’, 
the head of the State Duma housing committee Galina Khovanskaya, and others - at an event at the Institute for 
Urban Economics, 4 June 2015, http://old.urbaneconomics.ru/news/index213b.html?mat_id=1815#.  
21 See http://echo.msk.ru/blog/echo_rating/1504966-echo/  
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president and the government” (Chemezov 2014), Levitskaya keeps a low public profile compared 
to other vocal figures in the social bloc, Ol’ga Golodets in particular. She has participated in a great 
variety of meetings with state and non-state organisations on diverse social issues, including 
housing, healthcare, childhood protection,22 youth, the elderly and disabled, as well as civil society 
development, including philanthropy and volunteering.23 The last issue received significant 
attention during the most recent presidential address to the Federal Assembly on 1 December 2016 
(Putin 2016). It is almost never reported what Levitskaya says in these meetings, but she receives 
high praise from many sources – consider the above quote from Sergei Chemezov. She most likely 
acts as an important coordinator for social matters in the presidential administration and between it 
and other parts of the executive. As to whether she supports “active social policy”, and therefore is 
opposed to budget cuts to “productive” social sectors, is difficult to say conclusively. It appears 
likely, though, that like Shuvalov Levitskaya holds pro-growth policy views. 
 
By contrast, deputy prime minister for social issues Ol’ga Golodets, the head of the government’s 
social bloc, is an outspoken public figure. She has a background in labor economics, and worked in 
high positions in large private companies (Norilsk Nickel) and regional administrations (Taimyr and 
Moscow), supervising personnel and social issues. She joined Medvedev’s government in May 
2012 (http://government.ru/gov/persons/186/bio/). Within the government Golodets supervises 
matters ranging from family policy and demography, healthcare, education, pensions, to life style 
and culture. She is a member of the government Budget Commission and presidential commissions 
and committees, notably the Council for Strategic Development and Priority Projects.  In the recent 
period of budget consolidation Golodets protested against the freezing, cancellation or replacement 
with one-time payments of respectively biudzhetnik salaries, social benefits, Maternity Capital and 
pensions, as will be discussed below. On such questions she clashed with Anton Siluanov, Minister 
of Finance, and Aleksei Uliukaev, Minister of Economics, who took rigid positions on the 
indexation of social spending (Kuvshinova et al 2016). Even when decisions were seemingly taken, 
as at the 24 June 2016 session of the Budget Commission, Golodets insisted that negotiations 
continue. Together with other ministers in the social bloc, notably Veronika Skvortsova of the 
Ministry of Healthcare, Maxim Topilin of the Ministry of Labour, and Dmitriy Livanov of the 
Ministry of Education and Science, Golodets held out against economic and financial bloc pressure 
                                                          
22 See, for instance, the session of the presidential coordination council for the national strategy for children 
2012-17,  http://xn--c1ackabuhcbecyrh.xn--p1ai/news/193. 
23 http://www.donorsforum.ru/reports/rabochaya-vstrecha-foruma-donorov-s-sovetnikom-prezidenta-po-
voprosam-ekonomicheskogo-razvitiya-i-sotsialnoj-sfery-aleksandroj-levitskoj/  
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and their advocacy of stricter targeting, and the “scientific” evidence supplied by associated experts 
on the limited impact of social programs (Manuilova 2016a).  
 
In these exchanges, defending “popular policies” is central, while what is less popular can be 
sacrificed to spending cuts. The social bloc is prepared to appeal to ideology, arguing that such 
policies as Maternity Capital (a large cash benefit to mothers with housing policy implications) are 
the quintessence of the current social priorities of the government, particularly with respect to 
stimulating births and thus addressing demographic problems. This measure, popular with the 
public and construed by social bloc officials as existentially important for the country, has been 
retained – albeit without indexation - in the next three year budget (Sapozhnikov 2016).  
 
Protesting too hard, nonetheless, can be harmful, as Minister of Education Livanov learned when he 
was replaced by Olga Vasil’eva in early September 2016.24 At a budget meeting (soveshchanie) 
held by Medvedev on 29 July Livanov presented a report demonstrating that the reduction in 
spending on education envisaged in the Ministry of Finance’s draft documents would cause 
significant damage to the higher education system and, moreover, would jeopardise the goal set in 
the May decrees to increase teachers’ salaries (Netreba 2016c). Medvedev suggested that the two 
ministries resolve their differences between themselves. The process clearly failed, as Livanov 
resigned on 19 August, and his stance was later dismissed by Medvedev as an attempt to use a 
difficult situation to score political points.25 Nonetheless, Livanov’s protest against budget cuts 
resonated with the public and was harmful for the government’s popularity (Netreba 2016a). As a 
result, by late summer 2016 Medvedev’s position as premier fell into doubt. His blunt statements 
about indexation of pensions as quoted at the beginning of this article and comments regarding 
teachers’ salaries in early August did not help.26 The tension was to a certain degree defused by 
Livanov’s dismissal. Yet, as Levada Centre data show the government’s and Medvedev’s personal 
ratings suffered badly (http://www.levada.ru/2016/12/15/dekabrskie-rejtingi-2/). 
 
                                                          
24 Vasilieva joined the government from the Presidential Administration, where she worked in the department 
for civic projects. 
25 At Government zasedanie, 13 October 2016, http://government.ru/meetings/24877/stenograms/. 
26 See http://www.rline.tv/news/2016-08-04-vy-zhe-uchitelya-zachem-vam-dengi-sotsseti-kommentiruyut-
medvedeva/ 4 August 2016 and https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QFKiMgrVnYQ. 
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While prepared to fight hard over politically sensitive social spending, the social bloc is prepared to 
be more flexible over those budgetary measures which might be perceived as less “harmful” in 
terms of public opinion. In order to increase budget revenues, the social bloc suggested “learning 
from Belarus”, by introducing a charge for “non-working” working age persons to cover the costs 
of social services used by them. The assumption is that these people are employed in the shadow 
economy. The suggestion was opposed by the Ministry of Economics as a measure that would 
immediately run into definitional issues.27 It and the Ministry of Finance supported a different 
approach to increasing the collection of social contributions.28 Other proposals were expected to be 
more popular with the public, including the suggestion of the social bloc to freeze salaries and 
gradually increase the retirement age for state officials (Manuilova 2016b). Generally, the Russian 
public negatively views rises in the remuneration of state officials (Gimpelson et al 2009: 231). 
 
In some of its policy views the social bloc joins with those of the pro-growth actors around the 
Stolypin club. Golodets explicitly supports the initiatives of the latter because of the possible 
expansion of employment that their “Strategy of growth” would bring. She also has been involved 
in consideration of their proposals within the government’s inter-departmental working group.29 
Nevertheless, apart from potential gains in employment Golodets has not endorsed the central 
premises expressed by Stolypin Club members, Sergei Glaziev and Andrey Klepach30 in particular, 
involving monetary emission and reducing Central Bank base rates to boost business activity 
(Butrin 2016a). The social bloc’s position is linked with the slow growth model based on internal 
demand applied in 2010-13. The financial and economic bloc, as can be seen in the Macro-
Economic Forecast presented by the Ministry of Economics to a cabinet meeting on 21 April 2016 
and which became the basis for the 2017-19 budget, aimed specifically to restrain biudzhetnik 
                                                          
27 See Mintrud nameren prorabotat’ kriterii dlia platel’shchkov “naloga na tuneyadstvo”, 30 September 2016 17:03 
available at https://rns.online/economy/Mintrud-nameren-prorabotat-kriterii-dlya-platelschikov-naloga-na-
tuneyadstvo-2016-09-30/ 
28 They backed the transfer of the administration of pension and other social taxes from the Pension Fund and 
other extra-budgetary funds to the Federal Tax Service to make the enforcement of tax collection more 
straightforward, improving the take up and thus budget revenues. 
29 See http://stolypinsky.club/2016/08/02/pozitsiya-stolypinskogo-kluba-mne-blizka-golodets-podderzhala-
opponentov-minfina/ and http://stolypinsky.club/2016/10/19/titov-programma-stolypinskogo-kluba-
strategiya-rosta-v-yanvare-budet-predstavlena-prezidentu/ ; also see Orekhin 2016b 
30 Sergei Glaziev and Andrey Klepach are members of the Stolypin Club presidium 
http://stolypinsky.club/prezidium/. In addition, since December 2016 Glaziev and Klepach have been on the 
research council of the newly formed P.A. Stolypin Institute for the Economics of Growth (Nikolaeva 2016, 
http://stolypinsky.club/2016/12/21/predstavlena-struktura-strategii-rosta/). 
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earnings. Their intent was to redirect funds from consumption towards investment (Butrin 2016b; 
Manuilova 2016c).  
 
The position of Aleksei Kudrin – who shares the same ideas as the key figures of the financial bloc, 
including Nabiullina, Siluanov and Gref in relation to monetary regulation – differs from theirs in 
relation to personal incomes and social spending. He adds an important “active social policy” 
component to the policies supported by the Ministry of Finance and the CBR. He has insisted on a 
change of emphasis in social spending priorities, towards those that enhance the development of 
human capital, and on introducing better means-testing and targeting for other social benefits. This 
policy, argue Kudrin and a group of experts at the Ministry of Finance’s Financial Institute and at 
the Russian Academy for the National Economy and Public Administration (RANKhiGS), would in 
time generate considerable improvements in living standards (Manuilova 2016a, Orekhin 2016a, 
Butrin 2016a). As a politician, however, Kudrin has to search for ways to increase the popularity of 
the policy of retrenchment. This requires demonstrating “considerable improvement in living 
standards” in the very short term. As deputy chair of the Presidential Economic Council from mid-
May 2016 and having convened a meeting of one hundred important experts in early June 
(Khamraev 2016), he (or they) seem to have proposed the relaunch of the Priority Projects referred 
to earlier, with the Council for Strategic Development and Priority Projects being formed by the end 
of June.     
 
 
Indexation of social payments: salaries of public employees, pensions and Maternity Capital 
One of the most contentious questions permeating the budget process has been the indexation of 
social payments. This section considers how the actors examined above interacted in the budget 
policy process on this important matter. Indexation of social payments is an issue of high electoral 
salience: the government put off the usual spring amendments to the 2016 budget until autumn in 
order to postpone unpopular decisions relating to indexation until after the September parliamentary 
elections (Visloguzov 2016b). The indexation of biudzhetnik salaries, pensions and such important 
social payments as Maternity Capital has been the subject of clashes and negotiations between the 
social and economic-financial blocs of the government. The debate is whether and how much 
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indexation would be affordable in changing economic circumstances, and which categories of social 
payments should be prioritized.  
 
The pledge to increase salaries of biudzhetniki - above all teachers, doctors and scientists - was, as 
noted, part of the May decrees adopted in 2012 and fits with the ideology of investing in human 
capital. However, as budget revenues dropped by nearly R3 trillion in 2015, a proposal to reduce or 
forego altogether the inflation-linked 5.5 percent indexation of biudzhetnik salaries was voiced by 
Minister of Finance Siluanov in early February 2015 (Faliakhov and Kalachikhina 2015). Yet, in 
that year the indexation of salaries did go ahead, as the government agreed an anti-crisis plan in 
which funding for the social sphere increased by 23.5 percent nominally and 14.4 percent in real 
terms (World Bank 2016: 17). The issue re-surfaced during budgetary discussions the next spring, 
when the government and then the Duma considered the Ministry of Economy’s Forecast of Macro-
Economic Development. The ministry proposed an investment-led growth model for the 2017-19 
budget, which would restrain income growth in the budget sphere (Butrin 2016b, Manuilova 
2016c). The aim was to increase the volume of investment in the economy from 3.8 percent in 2017 
to 7.1 percent in 2019, when it would reach 24.1 percent of GDP and deliver economic growth of 
4.5 percent. The other side of the “Russian economic miracle”, however, would be the reduction of 
personal incomes by 3 percent and pensions by 4.8 percent. The ministry insisted that the super-
tight monetary policy conducted by the Ministry of Finance and CBR aimed at bringing inflation 
down to 4 percent in 2017 would soften the adverse effect of income reduction on the public.  
 
The social bloc and Stolypin Club of pro-growth actors, as well as those who supported an “active 
social policy”, strongly disagreed with such an attack on personal incomes. In April 2016 Klepach 
argued that, while low inflation and economic investment were important, a sharp reduction in 
social spending would lead to the impoverishment of those in public employment. This would 
inevitably drive down the quality of their work, which is counterproductive for Russia’s growth and 
competitiveness in the global economy (Manuilova 2016d). Klepach proposed squaring the circle 
by increasing public borrowing. Ol’ga Golodets, speaking at the Federation Council in September, 
was equally disapproving, pointing out that there are working poor in Russia, evident in the salary 
levels of biudzhetniki.31 Kudrin also criticized reductions in spending for education and healthcare, 
                                                          
31 For instance 
http://www.aif.ru/money/economy/golodec_osudila_nalichie_v_rossii_rabotayushchih_no_bednyh_lyudey  
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and suggested a three-fold increase in borrowing for 2017-19.32 Sergei Naryshkin, speaker of the 
sixth State Duma, in searching for a publically acceptable form of budget cuts said that the 
parliament might support freezing salaries of those employed in state administration, but would 
defend teachers’ and doctors’ earnings (Manuilova 2016d).  
 
In the budget draft approved by the government in early October the indexation and raising of 
biudzhetnik salaries contained in the May decrees was left de facto unresolved. Only 30 percent of 
funding for this purpose was to come from the federal budget and 70 percent left for regional 
budgets (Butrin et al 2016), most of which were already deeply in debt (Zubarevich 2016). The 
executive, wary of being decisive on this sensitive issue, shifted the decision-making to the budget’s 
second reading in the Duma in early December. There the Duma’s committee for budget and 
taxation proposed limiting the growth of salaries for doctors to 5.4 percent instead of the suggested 
10.6 percent. The rationale was to reduce the pressure on regional budgets (which according to the 
new budget would be credited from the federal budget at below-inflation interest rates) and avoid 
the situation where, in pursuit of increasing salaries, regions had to lay off teachers and doctors. The 
first protests against such developments took place in Moscow in late November.33 The next day a 
spokesman for Putin reacted by saying that no decision on capping the increase in biudzhetnik 
salaries had been made by the government or president, with the issue still being a matter of 
“soglasovanie” among different policy participants. Golodets then affirmed that doctors’ and 
teachers’ salaries would be twice the average regional salary in 2018.34 The Duma adopted the 
budget law at the third reading two days following these exchanges, on 9 December. Budget sector 
employees’ salaries will continue to be a battleground in the future.   
 
Another, and for some the most fundamental question of the budgetary process in 2016, was the 
indexation of pensions. In 2015 pensions were indexed from 1 February at 11.4 percent. For 2016 
Siluanov, as already mentioned, proposed the partial or zero indexation of social payments, 
including pensions (Faliakhov and Kalachikhina 2015). Pensions are the biggest cash transfer from 
the state to citizens in Russia (Remington 2011). Cash flows within the pension system amount to 
                                                          
32 Rossia 24 reporting from Sochi Investment Forum, 30 September 15:54 
33 Pro et contra: Kak uluchshit’ kachestvo meditsiny v Rossii?, 6 December 2016, Kommersant FM, 20:42 
34 For the Duma’s budget committee proposal, Peskov’s statement and Golodets’ hopes see 
http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3163811 7 December 2016 
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9.8 percent of GDP.35 (See Table 2.)  Three forms of pension (insurance, social and state) are 
distributed by the state to 43.2 million people. For the Russian authorities this is a large and 
politically active social group. The protests following the monetization of benefits are vividly 
remembered. The sensitive issue of partial indexation was considered by the government during 
2015, and was announced by Medvedev at the 7 October meeting of the government’s Budget 
Commission. In February 2016 a partial four percent indexation was paid. It was promised that a 
second indexation would be paid in the second half of the year, subject to the overall economic and 
social situation. The social bloc insisted on the second indexation according to inflation, meaning an 
indexation of 8.56 percent from 1 September 2016 (Netreba and Faliakhov 2016). Yet, over the 
summer, particularly at the 24 June meeting of the Budget Commission, the Ministry of Finance 
proposed that the second indexation should be replaced by a one-time payment. The social bloc 
continued to fight against this option during the late summer. The media reported that the final 
decision was taken personally by Putin and Medvedev.36 After a government meeting 
(soveshchanie) on 23 August Medvedev announced that pensioners would receive a one-time 
payment of five thousand rubles in January 2017, at a cost to the budget of R200 billion.37 The 
rationale pursued by the Ministry of Finance was that, unlike indexation, the one-time payment 
would not increase the entitlement base of current pensions, allowing the budget to save R1.3trln 
over 2017-19 (Netreba and Faliakhov 2016).  
 
This was immediately followed by the announcement of “full indexation” in 2017. Defining what 
“full indexation” meant took some time. If during the summer of 2016 the Ministry of Finance’s 
plans mentioned 5.9, 4.5 and 4 percent for 2017, 2018 and 2019 respectively (ibid), in September it 
proposed a “4-4-4” percent formula (Kriuchkova and Butrin 2016b). The final word was 
pronounced by President Putin. At a 6 October soveshchanie on social and economic issues Putin 
demanded full indexation of pensions at the current inflation rate (ibid).  At the same time, he was 
receptive to suggestions from economic experts such as Kudrin regarding better targeting and 
means-testing of social payments. In line with this rationale, in the new budget working pensioners 
would not have their pensions indexed over the next three years, and pensioners residing abroad 
would not receive the five thousand ruble payment in January 2017.  
 
                                                          
35 According to forecast Pension Fund spending for 2016 (Fedunenko et al 2016).  
36 See https://www.gazeta.ru/business/news/2016/08/17/n_9007235.shtml  
37 See https://www.gazeta.ru/business/news/2016/08/23/n_9029717.shtml  
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Table 2. Balance of the Pension Fund of Russia, billion rubles 
 
 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
       Revenues 5256 5890 6388 6159 7127 7625 
  all transfers received 2385 2823 2852 2415 3105 3367 
    transfers from federal budget 2384 2820 2847 2413 3092 3355 
  total revenue minus all transfers received 2870 3067 3537 3744 4021 4258 
Expenditures 4922 5451 6379 6190 7670 7830 
Deficit (-) / Surplus (+) 334 439 10 -31 -544 -204 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Rosstat and BOFIT 
 
In recent years another controversial and related issue has been the freezing of the saving 
component of the pension system.38 This measure, first taken in 2013, has changed the cash flows in 
the pension domain and allowed the creation of a “Presidential reserve” fund (approximately R350 
billion in 2016). Originally implemented on the insistence of the social bloc, the sum has been used 
to prop up the Pension Fund (PFR) deficit (see Table 2).  According to reports the money was also 
used for the restructuring of the Crimean economy after annexation in March 2014 (Orlov 2014). In 
relation to this policy, the positions within the economic-financial bloc contradicted one another. 
While the Ministry of Finance was supportive, Minister of Economics Uliukaev over the entire 
period up until his dismissal in November 2016 continued to insist that the money should be used 
for economic development and previously frozen resources be released (ibid, Faliakhov and 
Kalachikhina 2015, Rossia 24).  
 
Plans for the gradual release of funds were discussed during 2016, accompanied by increased 
market activity and lobbying by independent pension funds (NPFs). The CBR, interested in forming 
a long-term funding capacity in the economy, has worked to improve the regulation and current 
operations of Russian NPFs (Aksenov 2016). The Ministry of Finance, while interested in removing 
the deficit but realizing the importance of the saving component given Russia’s aging population, 
proposed a new scheme called “Pension capital”. Its key feature was that funds saved by working 
individuals would remain their property, rather than being property of the Pension Fund (Fedunenko 
                                                          
38 For the recent – up to early-2015 – history of the issue and the policy process involved see Remington (2015). 
For the earlier period also see Sutela (2012) and Cook (2007). 
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et al 2016). Pro-growth actors, Andrei Klepach for instance, while not dismissing this idea 
altogether, supported Uliukaev’s position, insisting that “defreezing” of the savings component was 
necessary to restore citizens’ trust in the pension system, as well as to provide additional investment 
for the economy.39 If a partial release of funds were to go ahead, the NPFs would receive R60 
billion in 2017.40 However, the social bloc was entirely opposed to the proposal, which would 
redirect revenues away from the Pension Fund. Golodets managed to defend this position during 
September, following the loss of the battle for the second indexation a month earlier. The “Basic 
directions of budget policy for 2017-2019”, considered by the government and the president in early 
October, included the continuation of the freeze, in which case budget transfer to the Pension Fund 
in 2017 would grow by R663.1 billion, while total holdings of the Fund would reach R8.18 
trillion.41 
 
Finally we turn to the issue of the indexation of “Maternity Capital” (MC). Originally introduced in 
2007 the measure is seen as a way to improve the birthrate by encouraging families to have more 
than one child. In the mid-2000s the birthrate was 1.3 births per woman. It had reached 1.78 by 
2015 (Putin 2016). The MC has been also a component of Russian housing policy (Khmelnitskaya 
2015), since one of the popular uses of the payment has been to buy property or take out or repay 
mortgage credit. MC at the time of its introduction was R250,000 and was paid from the Pension 
Fund. It was subject to annual indexation and by 2015 it had increased to R453,000, costing the 
Pension Fund R304 billion (Fedunenko et al 2016). Over the decade of the MC’s existence, six 
million families have benefited and the amount paid was one trillion rubles (Manuilova 2016e).  
 
The Ministry of Finance’s idea to forego the indexation of biudzhetnik salaries and social payments 
affected the MC as well. A debate arose within expert and policy circles regarding its effectiveness 
with respect to both demography and housing policy. For instance, many reports of fraud involving 
MC money in the housing market have appeared in the newspapers (Goriacheva 2016). In the 
meantime, social policy experts from the Higher School of Eeconomics claimed that such measures 
were ineffective in stimulating births (Kuzminov et al 2015, Manuilova 2016e). Experts from 
RANKhiGS disagreed and advised that the measure should be continued as an important instrument 
                                                          
39 https://rns.online/economy/Zampred-VEBa-Klepach-ne-verit-v-realizatsiyu-pensionnoi-modeli-Minfina-i-
TSB-2016-09-30/  
40 see https://www.gazeta.ru/business/news/2016/09/27/n_9156221.shtml  
41 see https://www.gazeta.ru/business/news/2016/10/07/n_9194969.shtml  
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of social support for families with children (Manuilova 2016e, Sapozhnikov 2016). The economic 
and financial bloc sided with the HSE experts and tried to eliminate the MC during 2015, a position 
opposed by the social bloc. Putin in his state of the nation address in December 2015 supported the 
social bloc and said that the programme would continue until at least 2019 (Manuilova 2016e). The 
debate resurfaced as part of the budgetary process in 2016. In addition to the demands of the 
Ministry of Economics to close down the programme completely, new suggestions emerged from 
RANKhiGS specialists that it be means tested and/or divided into regional and federal components. 
The former component would be paid only in regions with low fertility. This would, for instance, 
exclude the North Caucasus Federal district where birthrates are high. As the discussion of the 2016 
budget and the next three-year budget unfolded the social bloc, particularly the Ministry of Labour, 
emphasized the excellent results being delivered by the program (ibid, Sapozhnikov 2016). A 
month later it was confirmed that, as the social bloc insisted, the program would stay, although 
without indexation in 2016, leaving the payment at the 2015 level of R453,000. It remains to be 
seen how long this mass (6 million participants and voters), popular and expensive program will 
remain part of the budget. In contrast to the 2015 Presidential address, in December 2016 Putin 
spoke of “human capital” when he noted positive trends in Russian demographics; he also referred 
to “capital” in a financial sense a number of times. Yet there was no mention of the Maternity 
Capital program.  
 
Budget issues in the social sphere are not restricted to indexation. In recent times policy-makers 
have been busy introducing other measures to both the spending and revenue sides of the social 
budget. In the housing sphere, important issues include major repairs, territorial development, 
mortgage funding, and the administration of property and land taxes – the last related to the revenue 
side of the budget. Structural reforms within the pension sphere – increasing the retirement age, 
reducing the number of early retirees, increasing the length of the employment requirement, 
cancelling pensions for working pensioners – as well as improving the collection of social 
contributions and reducing the shadow part of the economy are topics that have recurred during the 
budget process over the years, with the recent crisis years being no exception. While Putin’s 
moratorium on tax increases during his current term in office has remained in place, certain 
tentative steps towards institutional reforms have, nevertheless, been taken recently: for example, 
decisions to increase the retirement age of state administration employees, to exclude the pensions 
of working pensioners from indexation, and to introduce administrative changes to the collection of 
pension contribution, to be carried out by the Tax Service from 2017. There is insufficient space in 
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the present article to analyse these developments. Further research could examine how and to what 
effect Russian bureaucratic and societal actors, while negotiating the current retrenchment of the 
Russian welfare state (for comparative literature on retrenchment, see Pierson 1994), went about 
redefining the institutional foundations of the country’s social policy.  
 
Finally, we can briefly compare policy-making over the last two years involving social and 
economic-financial blocs pushing against each other while also trying to escape responsibility for 
tough decisions on social matters with budget policy-making during the crisis period of 2008-2009. 
Sutela (2012:164) argues that during that time: “… the debate between fiscal conservatism and 
development was won by social policy”. The trend of increased social outlays associated with the 
period is evident in Table 1. Pointing to the importance of structural background of policy-making, 
Russian state finances were in a more robust condition in 200842. However, the political factors 
were highly important. Vladimir Putin’s premiership allowed manual control of the Russian 
government response to the global financial crisis, the response which effectiveness has been 
praised by international monetary institutions (ibid: 227). The authority locus at the Vladimir 
Putin’s government meant that the Russian executive was less divided, with many influential 
policy-makers now scattered between its different parts (Nabiullina, Belousov, Klepach, Shuvalov 
and Levitskaya) and outside of it (Kudrin) working at Putin’s ministries. Moreover, shared ideas, 
involving concern for social issues expressed in the Concept 2020 adopted in 2008 and supported 
by the paternalistic attitude of Prime Minister Putin – meant that both economic-financial and social 
wings of the government supported the increase in social spending, particularly pensions, 
introduced in March 2009, to prop domestic demand as a response to the crisis (Sutela 2012: 222-
23). This unity was not something the Russian executive displayed during 2014-2016.  
 
Conclusion  
The policy process traced in this paper generally approximates the view that policy-making in 
Russia begins with the President setting the general policy direction, which is followed by 
bureaucratic stakeholders and affiliated non-state actors becoming locked in battle to determine the 
details. The social budget policy-making analysed in this paper has been primarily concentrated 
                                                          
42 Policy-makers relied on the large reserves in a form of the Stabilisation Fund, Rub 142.6bln on the eve of the 
crisis in September 2008 (Minfin data, Orekhin 2016a). During the current period the Russian Reserve and 
National Welfare Funds are expected to be gradually depleted (http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3167919). 
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within the executive. Within the executive, as far as the social sphere is concerned, the usual 
distinction that is drawn between supporters of monetary restraint and adherents of growth policies 
is not quite straightforward. While a divide can be drawn between the economic-financial and social 
blocs of the government, the policy positions of the actors comprising these blocs vis-à-vis the 
diverse elements of social policy are intertwined in perhaps unexpected ways. For instance, Andrey 
Klepach, associated with pro-growth actors, and Alexei Kudrin, usually considered as a part of the 
financial bloc, have both supported increases in public borrowing in order to fund social spending. 
Together with Golodets, they have resisted freezing salaries for budget sphere employees, a 
Ministry of Finance proposal. At the same time, the attitudes of these actors towards the targeting of 
social benefits have varied. If fiscal conservatism, consistently promoted on behalf of the president 
by the Ministry of Finance, has represented the baseline for the social budget, the positions of other 
actors have mattered for defining details of current policies and setting future agendas, as with 
means-testing and targeting. The position of the social ministries led by vice-Premier Ol’ga 
Golodets in most cases amounts to resisting budget cuts whenever possible, but being flexible when 
the political sensitivity of a matter requires it, as in the case of indexation. President Putin interfered 
in the process only when the most salient and controversial issues were at stake, such as the 
indexation of pensions - but not biudzhetnik salaries, which were left as a matter of institutional 
“soglasovanie”. For the president, prime minister and social bloc actors the pursuit of popular 
policies, that would demonstrate the utmost concern for the public welfare and generate popular 
support for the political regime, has been paramount.  
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